Why Legal Network Quality Control Requires Costly Central Oversight
“At the centre of the network of the platform, it should be a centralised structure that can perform quality control, but this requires very skilled lawyers, of course, because they should be able to supervise the job done by the single lawyers in the various jurisdictions. This requires very good lawyers, very well-trained lawyers. And this, of course, is costly.”
The Partner-Associate Truth
Bernardo Cartoni begins with a personal admission that illuminates a systemic problem in legal services. “I remember at the beginning of my career, more than 30 years ago, I was just a fresh graduate and was in an Italian firm, big, big for the Italian market more than 30 years ago,” Cartoni recalls.
The practice he describes is widespread but rarely acknowledged: “The client hired and paid for the partner, but who did the work? The young Bernardo. And this is a little bit unfair to the client.” The confession is significant not because the practice is unusual—it’s standard in large law firms—but because Cartoni explicitly frames it as a fairness problem.
The issue compounds in international networks. When a client hires a renowned firm for multi-jurisdictional work, they may assume senior expertise across all jurisdictions. The reality is often junior lawyers in secondary markets supervised remotely, if at all. “It is necessary to ensure the client that the matter is actually handled by that particular competent lawyer,” Cartoni argues.
This transparency gap creates the need for quality control that Cartoni advocates. Without oversight, clients have no mechanism to verify that the expertise they’re paying for is the expertise they’re receiving. The problem isn’t necessarily incompetence—junior lawyers can be excellent—but misrepresentation about who is actually performing the work.
When Size Doesn’t Guarantee Suitability
Cartoni challenges assumptions about firm size and capability. “I think it’s not only a question of the size of the law firm,” he argues. “Of course, the local law firm that wants to deal with some international matters with a big law firm risks paying a lot of fees or more precisely, the client risks paying a lot of fees.”
The alternative he suggests: “From that perspective, a medium or a boutique law firm can be more suitable.” But size alone doesn’t determine quality. “There is another point… In his schedule, there is not only the name of the law firm but also comments on the single lawyers, and this is very important because I can go to a very renowned, a very big law firm, but for that particular issue, they cannot have the right person.”
Cartoni refers here to Pengfei Wu’s friend list methodology, endorsing the focus on individual lawyers rather than firm brands. The insight challenges how international legal services are marketed and purchased. Firm reputation provides a screening mechanism, but it doesn’t guarantee that the specific lawyers assigned to a matter have relevant expertise.
“Moreover, it is necessary to ensure the client that the matter is actually handled by that particular competent lawyer,” Cartoni emphasises. This returns to his earlier concern: clients need mechanisms to verify not just firm capability but individual lawyer competence and involvement.
The Platform Quality Control Challenge
Cartoni distinguishes between platforms that are mere directories and those that provide genuine quality assurance. “There are also platforms, but platforms have another issue. If they are only a list of lawyers in a given jurisdiction, I think it’s only not a waste of time, but not a guarantee.”
The differentiator is oversight: “Where a platform can make a difference is if the platform can guarantee a sort of quality control. Quality control in the lawyer admitted, but also quality control on the work actually performed.” Both dimensions matter—vetting who joins the network and monitoring what they produce.
But Cartoni immediately identifies the obstacle: “Of course, it’s not a simple issue at the centre of the network of the platform it should be a centralized structure that can perform quality control but this requires very skilled lawyers, of course, because they should be able to supervise the job done by the single lawyers in the various jurisdictions.”
The requirement is demanding: “This requires very good lawyers, very well-trained lawyers.” And the conclusion is unavoidable: “And this, of course, is costly.” The cost creates a business model problem. Platforms want to scale by adding lawyers to their networks. But meaningful quality control doesn’t scale—it requires senior expertise that must be compensated.
Cartoni suggests, however, that this cost could be a competitive advantage: “it’s easier for the client to say, okay, maybe I can spend a little bit more, but going into that platform, I’m sure that the outcome will be good.” The qualification is important: “Of course, outcome of skills deployed, not outcome of, for instance, a litigation. No platform can guarantee you that the judge will award you the claim.”
The distinction matters. Quality control can verify that skilled lawyers performed competent work. It can’t guarantee favourable outcomes when judges, juries, or counterparties decide results. Cartoni argues that this limited but real guarantee—”the outcome will be good” in terms of work quality—justifies the additional cost.
Who Should Control Quality?
When asked whether large law firms or the network itself should perform quality control, Cartoni takes a clear position: “From my perspective, it should be the network itself to perform the quality control, not the big law firm, because no one can guarantee that the big law firm can perform a better quality control than the small one.”
This challenges hierarchical assumptions in international legal networks. The argument isn’t that big firms lack quality control capacity—they obviously have it for their own work. Rather, Cartoni suggests that firm size doesn’t correlate with the ability to supervise other firms’ work across jurisdictions.
Peter Ruggle raised a significant objection during the discussion: client-attorney privilege. “When the network tries to make equality control, we have regulation, we have the lawyer’s privilege. I’m not allowed to disclose that to the network, because the network is another body than my law firm. And my client’s privilege is at the door of my office. That’s it.”
Cartoni responds with a structural solution: “I understand Peter’s concern, and this is true, but it can be a solution. If the client somehow hires the network, it is the network to be also bound by confidentiality and privacy.”
The key is relationship structure: “So the quality control is not something external to the legal team, but the quality surveyor is someone that is a part of the legal team as a supervisor, like in an internal team in a law firm, you have say five associates and the partner that coordinates them.”
Cartoni’s proposal requires reimagining how networks operate. Rather than independent firms referring work to each other, the network itself becomes the client’s law firm, with member firms operating as internal divisions. The quality controller functions like a coordinating partner, with all parties bound by the same confidentiality obligations.
This model has precedent in large firm structures but would represent a significant shift for independent firm networks. It also reinforces Cartoni’s earlier point about cost—this level of integration and oversight requires investment that most networks avoid.
The Economics of Long-Term Relationships
Cartoni offers a framework for profit-sharing that emphasises patience over immediate returns. “We talked about profit-sharing, fee-sharing four weeks ago, so I don’t want to repeat myself. Summarising, don’t be afraid, don’t be too greedy.”
The principle works in both directions: “From a point of view, the lawyer who has contact with the client should not be afraid to share his profit, his fees with the other law firm, the other lawyers operating in another jurisdiction. And from the other side of the coin, of course, the foreign law firm should not be too greedy and take everything.”
But Cartoni’s most important advice concerns time horizon: “And of course, in profit sharing and fee sharing, we should be foresight. So, don’t think only about today, but the following five or ten years. Maybe giving a little bit more to the other law firm today will allow us to earn a lot of money in the following years.”
This long-term perspective challenges the quarterly thinking that dominates much professional service firm management. Cartoni argues that generosity in early transactions builds relationships that generate sustained revenue streams. The lawyer who squeezes every transaction for maximum immediate profit may win today but lose the relationship.
The advice is particularly relevant for firms in developing markets connecting with developed market firms. The temptation is to maximise revenue from each transaction, given uncertain future deal flow. Cartoni suggests that below-market pricing today—if it builds a reliable relationship—pays dividends over the years.
Adapting to Referral Fee Prohibitions
Cartoni addresses the referral fee challenge with characteristic pragmatism. “In Italy, pure referral fees are prohibited,” he explains. The solution: “So change the label.”
The repackaging is straightforward: “So not pure referral fees, but helping in contacting the client, helping in gathering evidence, and so on. And you have the solution by changing the label of the fees.” This isn’t evasion—it’s recognising that lawyers perform multiple services in cross-border matters beyond just making introductions.
The referring lawyer who helps gather evidence, provides preliminary analysis, or assists in client communication is performing compensable work. Calling this work what it is—client coordination, evidence gathering, preliminary research—rather than “referral fee” keeps the compensation compliant while sustaining the relationship.
Cartoni’s approach parallels Peter Ruggle’s preference for paid quotes and preliminary work. Both suggest that substantive service provision creates legitimate compensation opportunities even where pure referral fees are prohibited.
The strategy requires more work than simple referral fees—lawyers must actually perform the services they bill for. But it also creates value for clients who receive preliminary analysis and coordination rather than just a phone number. The result is compliance that serves client interests rather than circumventing them.
The Necessity of Single Coordinators
Cartoni argues strongly for centralised coordination in multi-jurisdictional matters. “I think the client needs a single stop,” he states. The reasoning goes beyond convenience: “And also, many lawyers, many thoughts, 10 lawyers, 11 different opinions. There must be one coordinator.”
The mathematical progression—”10 lawyers, 11 different opinions”—captures the tendency of legal advice to proliferate rather than converge. Without someone authorised to synthesise and decide, clients receive conflicting counsel with no clear path forward.
“So there must be a lawyer, a law firm that takes the lead and supervises. And this is the link with the client,” Cartoni explains. This coordinator role encompasses multiple functions: client communication, jurisdiction coordination, conflict resolution, and overall strategy.
When asked whether this coordination role should be compensated, Cartoni agrees: “Yes, of course.” The value added is clear—preventing the chaos of eleven conflicting opinions and providing clients with actionable, synthesised advice.
This position aligns with Peter Ruggle’s advocacy for explicit coordination fees. Both argue that coordination is specialised work deserving recognition and compensation. The alternative—treating coordination as overhead or business development—undervalues essential work and creates incentives for lawyers to avoid complex international matters.
About the Speaker: Bernardo Cartoni is Director of LexChina and a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, with over three decades of experience spanning Italy, Poland, England, and Wales, with deep engagement in arbitration centers in Hong Kong and Shanghai. Cartoni’s scholarly contributions on maritime arbitration and Belt and Road Initiative dispute resolution have shaped contemporary thinking on cross-border legal cooperation. His unique position bridging Eastern and Western legal systems provides him with a perspective on the structural and strategic challenges of alternative collaboration models in international legal practice. Cartoni advocates for quality-controlled platforms that can provide genuine oversight rather than mere lawyer directories, despite the significant costs such oversight requires.
